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Are European Union sanctions “targeted”?
Clara Portela
Singapore Management University and College of Europe
Abstract The emergence of targeted sanctions in the mid-1990s was due to the 
humanitarian impact of embargoes, which were deemed unacceptable and compelled senders 
to shift to measures designed to affect only wrongdoers. Twenty years on, the present paper 
considers the extent to which autonomous sanctions are designed to affect those individuals 
and elites responsible for the behaviour the EU aims to condemn. How faithful has the EU 
remained to this concept in its sanctions policy? The enquiry scrutinizes diverse practices 
in three established sanctions strands of the EU, development aid suspensions, Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) sanctions and Generalised Scheme of Preferences 
(GSP) withdrawals. It shows that it has been more faithfully implemented in some strands 
of EU sanctions than in others. Specifically in the flagship CFSP sanctions practice, the 
due process motivated court challenges of its blacklists have led the EU to modify selection 
criteria in a way that renders them potentially less targeted.
Introduction
After remaining paralysed by the ideological divisions that characterized the 
Cold War, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) dramatically increased 
its activity in the field of peace and security during the 1990s. This activation was 
visible in the dispatch of peace missions and the imposition of sanctions alike. The 
frequency of the adoption of new sanctions regimes, 16 in ten years as opposed 
to only two in the first 40 years of life of the organization, led experts to label the 
1990s as the “sanctions decade” (Cortright and Lopez 2000). Dissatisfaction with 
the negative impacts of sanctions regimes on target populations, and in particular 
the severe humanitarian consequences of the draconian embargo on Iraq, brought 
about a search for a refinement of the sanctions tool. The result of such reflection 
was the notion of “targeted sanctions”, also known as “smart sanctions”, 
which were meant to inflict harm on the responsible leaders while sparing the 
population from suffering. The development of targeted sanctions was, therefore, 
meant to be the “guillet de sauvetage” of an instrument whose legitimacy had 
been compromised (Brzoska 2003). The attempt to design sanctions to hit only 
the wrongdoers represents a fundamental innovation in the sanctions landscape. 
The United Nations (UN) has imposed only targeted sanctions regimes since the 
mid-1990s. Targeted sanctions form part of the sanctions practice of all major 
senders (Biersteker et al 2016), including some regional organizations (Charron 
and Portela 2015; Eriksson 2010). The world’s principal sender, the US, alternates 
targeted sanctions and comprehensive embargoes in its practice.
© 2016 Department of Politics and International Studies
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Leading expert Michael Brzoska anticipated in 2001 that ‘whether and how 
sanctions can be smart will remain a hotly debated issue for some time’ (Brzoska 
2001, 15). Scholars have questioned targeted sanctions’ ability to spare popula-
tions from suffering (Gordon 2011; 2015; Lopez 2012) as well as their feasibility 
(Tostensen and Bull 2002) and morality (Pattison 2015). Much of the debate has 
revolved around their compatibility with human rights (Heupel 2009). Few stud-
ies have inquired about their actual impacts (Cosgrove 2005; Wallensteen et al 
2006). Unsurprisingly, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the compar-
ative effectiveness of targeted measures in achieving policy objectives (Ashford 
2016; Neier 2015). Most early assessments have been negative: ‘More targeted 
impact also means more limited impact, also for those targeted’ (Elliott 2005, 11). 
Cortright and Lopez contend that ‘where economic and social impact have been 
greatest, political effects have also been most significant’ (2002, 8). Aviation and 
travel bans have been described as ‘not much more than a nuisance for targeted 
elites’ (Brzoska 2001, 70). This has led some authors to claim that ‘options other 
than smart sanctions should be pursued’ (Drezner 2011, 97), albeit some recent 
research on UN targeted sanctions claims that their effectiveness rate is compara-
ble to that of broader sanctions (Biersteker et al 2016).
In sum, research has “jumped” from discussing the notion to assessing its 
impacts. By contrast, the fundamental question of how the notion of targeted 
sanctions finds reflection in international sanctions practice has been scarcely 
explored. What do targeted sanctions look like in practice—that is, what shape(s) 
have they taken when implemented? Following some pioneering work which 
examined the “translation” of the concept of targeted measures into actual sanctions 
regimes (Wallensteen and Grusell 2012), the present article inquires how the notion 
of targeted sanctions has been “interpreted”, and how faithfully its implementation 
reflects the principles that inspired the notion. In other words, how well do sanctions 
presented as “targeted” correspond to the original formulation of the concept? This 
question is important because it has been recognized that even targeted sanctions 
can produce unintended humanitarian effects (Giumelli 2015). Recent research 
observed humanitarian consequences in 44 per cent of the episodes of UN targeted 
sanctions under study (Biersteker et al 2016, 28). In order to explore this issue, EU 
sanctions practice serves as a suitable case study. European countries were at the 
forefront of the re-invention of sanctions as targeted measures. Indeed, some of 
them promoted the adoption of the notion, convening the so-called “Sanctions 
Reform Process”, which consisted of a series of expert meetings to specify the 
concept and produce recommendations: the “Interlaken process”, the “Bonn-Berlin 
process” and the “Stockholm process” (Vines 2012; Wallensteen et al 2003). While 
the outcome of the reform processes was never formally endorsed by the UNSC, 
it proved enormously influential in the development of its working methods and 
sanctions practice and in reinforcing the normative shift away from comprehensive 
sanctions (Biersteker et al 2005; Weschler 2009). EU members Germany and 
Sweden sponsored the Sanctions Reform Process, alongside Switzerland. The first-
ever informal UNSC working group on sanctions issued its final report in 2006 
under the chairmanship of Greece (UNSC 2006). The recent High Level Review 
of UN Sanctions was sponsored by four EU members, Finland, Germany, Greece 
and Sweden, joined by Australia (UNGA 2015). In addition to its role in promoting 
the concept of targeted sanctions, the EU has embraced the notion in its sanctions 
practice. While the UNSC shifted from comprehensive to targeted sanctions in 
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1994, the EU has never imposed a comprehensive embargo on any country. The 
EU is one of the most active senders on the planet: a comparison of the volume of 
unilateral sanctions by regional organizations and the US from 1980 to 2014 shows 
that the EU alone accounts for 36 per cent of the total, closely approximating the 
figure of 36.9 per cent reached by the US (Borzyskowski and Portela 2016, 15).
This article is in four parts. Firstly, it analyses the concept of targeted sanctions, 
drawing on the reports issued by the Sanctions Reform Process. A second section 
looks at the adoption “on paper” of the notion of targeted sanctions by the EU. 
This part is followed by a review of EU sanctions instruments, looking at how the 
EU gives expression to its commitment to targeted measures, and contrasting it 
with the original formulation of “targeted-ness”. A final section concludes.
Re-inventing sanctions in the sanctions reform process
The idea of targeted measures was developed in response to the UNSC’s negative 
experiences with comprehensive trade embargoes. The realization did not come 
earlier because the UN experience with sanctions had been limited to two cases, 
Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977. Comprehensive trade embargoes entail 
the complete interruption of trade and finance with the target. Thus, their effects 
are severe, in particular when imposed in the form of mandatory measures by the 
UNSC, binding on all countries in the world.
The UNSC became acutely aware of the extent of the humanitarian impact 
of sanctions and of the unpopularity of these measures due to the international 
outcry provoked by the Iraqi catastrophe in the mid-1990s. In Iraq, the release 
of data on the high mortality rates among children and other vulnerable groups 
resulting from the embargo made clear to the UNSC that the employment of sim-
ilar measures would be unable to garner sufficient support from the international 
community (Brzoska 2003). This was best expressed in the unusually bold state-
ment of then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who criticized sanctions 
as follows:
‘They raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups 
in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders 
whose behaviour is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects’ (UNGA 
1995, 16).
However, renouncing the use of sanctions altogether would have deprived the 
UNSC of one of the few tools at its disposal. Thus, to “rescue” the instrument, 
the permanent members of the UNSC (the so-called P-5) issued a “non-paper” on 
the humanitarian effects of sanctions which stipulated that ‘any future sanctions 
regime should be directed to minimise unintended adverse side-effects of sanc-
tions on the most vulnerable segments of targeted countries’. They also pledged to 
assess the ‘short- and long-term humanitarian consequences of sanctions’, to give 
‘due regard to the humanitarian situation’ when reviewing sanctions in the Secu-
rity Council, and to envisage provisions ‘to allow unimpeded access to human-
itarian aid’ (UNSC 1995). As Elliott puts it, UN sanctions nowadays have more 
than one explicit goal, namely to achieve their political objective ‘and to do so 
without harming innocent civilians’ (Elliott 2009, 86–87).
The development of targeted sanctions was part and parcel of a broader trans-
formation in the construction of sanctions regimes by the UN in the post-Cold War 
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era (Eckert 2016; Weschler 2009). The UNSC targeted its measures by differentiat-
ing between actors, sometimes favouring one over the other. By 2000, the UNSC 
had acquired a habit of combining travel bans and asset freezes against individual 
decision makers. The UNSC has banned international flights, and trade in com-
modities that provided funding to targeted groups such as timber and diamonds, 
and it has applied sanctions to specific geographical areas within a state rather 
than to its entire territory (Giumelli 2015).
Thanks to the development of targeting, far from vanishing, sanctions have 
become the instrument of choice of the UNSC (Charron 2011; Weschler 2009). 
Experts posit that a return to comprehensive sanctions is ‘difficult to imagine’ 
(Biersteker et al 2005, 28) if not ‘inconceivable’ (Doxey 2009, 544). Once targeted 
sanctions have become the standard, we should develop a precise understanding 
of what measures can be described as “targeted”. To this end, the following sec-
tion complements the meagre definition contained in the 1995 non-paper—sanc-
tions regimes ‘directed to minimise unintended adverse side-effects of sanctions 
on the most vulnerable segments of targeted countries’ (UNSC 1995)—with the 
outcomes of the Sanctions Reform Process.
Targeting: rationales and concretization
Firstly, the rationale for the development of targeted sanctions ought to be exam-
ined. Their principal definitional element is their discriminatory nature—that is, 
their ability to affect specifically those responsible for objectionable actions. The 
objective is to ‘apply coercive pressure on transgressing parties—government offi-
cials, elites who support them or members of non-governmental entities’ (Bier-
steker 2001, ix). On the flipside, this entails avoiding impacts on others. According 
to the then-Swiss Foreign Minister Joseph Deiss, targeted sanctions ‘are designed 
to focus on groups of persons responsible … while ideally leaving other parts of 
the population and international trade relations unaffected’ (Deiss 2001, vi). This 
rationale highlights a preoccupation with humanitarian impacts on civilians in the 
target country, as the measures aim to avoid ‘causing excessive suffering to civil-
ian populations’ (Deiss 2001, vi). However, the complete eradication of impacts 
on non-targeted population sectors is not pursued. Instead, such effects should be 
kept to a minimum. Then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan spoke of ‘minimising the 
negative effects of the sanctions on the civilian population and neighbouring and 
other affected states’ (UNGA 2000, emphasis mine).
Targeting has also been associated with the expectation that sanctions will be 
more effective. The Bonn-Berlin process points to sanctions’ disappointing effec-
tiveness record as an impetus for the refinement of the tool (Brzoska 2001, 10). 
The report of the Interlaken process posits: ‘better targeting of such measures on 
the individuals responsible … and the elites who benefit from and support them 
would increase the effectiveness of sanctions’ (Biersteker 2001, ix). The then-Swed-
ish Secretary for Foreign Affairs confirmed this aspiration: ‘The overall ambition 
has been to enhance the prospects of sanctions achieving their stated objectives’ 
(Dahlgren 2003, viii).
Thus, the Sanctions Reform Process expanded the original rationale for targeted 
sanctions. While the P-5’s 1995 non-paper spelt out an unequivocal humanitarian 
rationale, the Sanctions Reform Process incorporated the idea of hitting the 
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wrongdoers and added the expectation of enhanced efficacy. Concurrently, the 
group of those who should be spared from the unintended adverse side-effects of 
sanctions was broadened from ‘the most vulnerable segments of targeted countries’ 
identified by the P-5 (UNSC 1995, 2) to ‘vulnerable populations and overall societies’ 
(Dahlgren 2003, viii). It also purported avoiding ‘collateral effects on third states’ 
(Dahlgren 2003, viii). In addition to promising not to provoke large-scale suffering 
and to deprive responsible leaders from the possibility of shielding themselves 
from the impact of the measures, the claim that targeted measures would maximize 
effectiveness rendered the notion more attractive to senders and to an international 
audience mainly concerned about the coercive capacity of the measures.
Some scholars contend that because targeted sanctions hit the wrongdoers 
while sparing the innocent, their introduction is justified on account of the 
promotion of justice (Herzog and Walton 2014), making the expectation of 
enhanced effectiveness superfluous. By contrast, others have situated the problem 
of comprehensive embargoes not in the causation of civilian suffering per se, but in 
their lack of proportion between the magnitude of this suffering and their effects on 
decision makers: ‘comprehensive trade embargoes against states have increasingly 
been perceived as not having the desired effects on the behaviour of the target 
state in comparison with the disruptions that these sanctions cause in civilian life’ 
(Stenhammar 2004, 145). The assumption that targeted sanctions are better placed 
to achieve their aims than their predecessors has found some scholarly validation 
Kirshner 1997. It has been posited that targeted sanctions are likely to be effective 
when applied against autocrats who rely on a small selectorate because these 
measures are better suited to adversely affect their power base (Brookes 2002).
Having determined their rationale, the next step consists in ascertaining which 
specific measures qualify as targeted sanctions. What justifies the inclusion of a 
particular measure in the targeted sanctions toolbox is its amenability to be tar-
geted at a pre-determined group of individuals, entities or sectors. The critical 
quality distinguishing a smart sanction is that ‘it is designed to hit at the interest 
of individuals or groups in positions of power directly, rather than the entity they 
control’ (Stenhammar 2004, 150).
The tools that have been put forward as targeted sanctions are not novel: most 
of them had been in use before. The UN Secretary-General, Sanctions Reform Pro-
cess experts and scholars have endeavoured to specify the nature of the instru-
ments. These feature selective embargoes, such as those on commodities or luxury 
goods, the denial of international travel, visas and educational opportunities to 
regime members and their families, and cultural and sports bans. Arms embar-
goes and aviation bans ‘qualify as targeted sanctions because they are partial 
bans, they can be tailored to predominantly affect certain groups of people, and 
their humanitarian effects on the larger population are generally minor’ (Brzoska 
2001, 10). Targeted financial sanctions encompass a broad group of measures 
which ‘are financial in that they involve the use of financial instruments [and] 
are sanctions in that they are coercive measures’ (Biersteker 2001, ix). They are 
defined as asset freezes—immobilizing financial resources and preventing new 
resources being made available to the blacklisted person or entity—, the blocking 
of financial transactions or financial services and the suspension of credits. While 
the list is potentially open-ended in the light of the criterion specified above, three 
principal categories have crystallized in the practice of the UN: visa bans, financial 
sanctions and arms embargoes (Eckert 2016).
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Most of these measures can have deprivational or disruptive impacts on their 
targets. Arms embargoes serve to restrict or deny access to military equipment, 
curtailing the ability of the target to pursue an armed conflict (Kirkham and 
Flew 2003). Visa bans can interfere with efforts to raise funds or acquire arms if 
foreign travel is required: Expert panels have linked the ability to travel abroad 
to the procurement of arms and funds (Wallensteen and Grusell 2012). Yet the 
specification of the measures is not free of difficulty. While targeted sanctions 
are discriminating policy measures, they vary in their degree of discrimination. 
A recent study suggests that different types of measures can been conceived 
as a continuum, with the most narrowly targeted measures on one end and 
the broadest on the other, depending on how discriminating each type is. On a 
“discrimination scale”, individually targeted sanctions such as travel bans are 
the most discriminating, while transportation bans and energy embargoes most 
closely approximate comprehensive sanctions (Biersteker et al 2016, 27). Among 
participants in the Bonn-Berlin process, differences emerged about what makes 
sanctions targeted. One view was that the term should be reserved for sanctions 
which directly aim at targeted elites and avoid pain to those not responsible, while 
another view favoured a broader use of the term targeted sanctions, including 
selective embargoes (Brzoska 2001, 69). Since aviation bans affect a wider section 
of the population than just the elite, they are less targeted than travel bans 
against named individuals. Doubts have been cast on the targeted nature of bans 
prohibiting nationals of the targeted state from participating in sports, cultural or 
scientific activities, given that these individuals would not be affected for their 
perceived support of a ruling group (Brzoska 2001, 47–48).
The “EU way” of sanctions
The analysis now turns to the EU’s ‘interpretation’ of targeted sanctions, attempt-
ing to evaluate EU sanctions policy against the definitional criteria identified in 
the previous section. The present analysis does not purport to assess the imple-
mentation or actual impacts of the measures as virtually no data exist on the unin-
tended consequences of EU sanctions. Instead, the focus is on assessing the design 
of the measures and its suitability to affect responsible wrongdoers as opposed to 
“innocent bystanders”. The method employed is an analysis of the design of dif-
ferent categories of sanctions instruments. In keeping with the above discussion, 
sanctions instruments will be scrutinized by applying two key criteria:
(a)  the ability of the sanctions to discriminate between targets and non-
targets; and
(b)  the suitability of exemptions to shield non-targeted populations from 
unintended harm.
Data are obtained from policy and legal documents, which provide information 
on the motivations of the sanctions regimes, the selection of specific sanctions 
measures, the criteria for blacklisting of persons and entities, and humanitarian 
exemptions and other measures geared to prevent civilian deprivation. The 
analysis is complemented with specialized literature.
For the purpose of the present analysis, sanctions are defined as the deliberate 
interruption, reduction or withdrawal of normal relations or of a benefit that 
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would otherwise be granted, in response to what is considered objectionable 
behaviour (Portela 2010). Thus, the analysis considers sanctions instruments 
according to the legal framework in which they are agreed, irrespective of their 
formal status in official EU terminology. While most research on EU sanctions 
focuses on the imposition of sanctions under the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP); (Cardwell 2015; Hellquist 2016), there is an increasing recognition 
that measures wielded in alternative frameworks qualify as sanctions too 
(de Vries and Hazelzet 2005; Koch 2015; Nivet 2015). This dovetails with 
the understanding prevalent in development studies (Molenaers et al 2015; 
Zimelis 2011) and sanctions scholarship (Jones 2015). Thus, the present analysis 
examines (i) CFSP sanctions, which belong to the realm of foreign policy; 
(ii) the suspension of aid under its Partnership Agreement with the African-
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states group, a development instrument; and (iii) 
the withdrawal of trade privileges under the General Scheme of Preferences 
(GSP), a trade tool.
The CFSP framework
The CFSP is the principal framework for foreign policy formulation in the EU. It 
is the venue for the framing of foreign policies outside the communitarized areas 
of trade and development. It operates by unanimity. Foreign policy co-ordination 
originated in the framework of the European Political Co-operation, in whose con-
text the first autonomous sanctions were wielded in the early 1980s, giving way 
to the CFSP in 1992. In the CFSP, sanctions are labelled “restrictive measures” and 
their adoption is reflected in legislative acts, “Common Positions” before the Lis-
bon Treaty and “Council Decisions” thereafter.
Even though its autonomous sanctions practice goes back to the 1980s 
(Koutrakos 2001), the EU only released policy documents on its sanctions policy 
concurrently with the European Security Strategy of 2003. ‘Guidelines on imple-
mentation and evaluation of its sanctions’ (Council of the European Union 2003) 
were followed by some ‘Principles for the use of sanctions’ which embraced the 
concept of targeted measures: 
Sanctions should be targeted in a way that has maximum impact on those whose 
behaviour we want to influence. Targeting should reduce to the maximum extent 
possible any adverse humanitarian effects or unintended consequences for persons 
not targeted or neighbouring countries. (Council of the European Union 2004, 3)
In the same document, the Council pledged to ‘further refine sanctions’ and 
‘improve their implementation’ (Council of the European Union 2004, 3). In this 
spirit, the Council subsequently updated the ‘Guidelines on implementation and 
evaluation’ of its sanctions (Council of the European Union 2012).
Yet these policy documents did not foresee the principal vulnerability of 
blacklists—namely, the lack of due process guarantees. On this basis, a number 
of designated individuals brought cases to court. After the European Court of 
Justice—renamed the Court of Justice in 2009—ruled in favour of the claimant 
in the landmark “Kadi” judgement in 2008, it subsequently annulled numerous 
listings because it considered they have been adopted on insufficient evidence 
(Heupel 2009). Interestingly, the designation in question in the Kadi case was 
not originally an EU listing, but it stemmed from a UNSC resolution. By 2014, 
Are European Union sanctions “targeted”? 919
as many as 110 challenges to listings concerning 290 individuals or entities had 
been brought before the Court of Justice of the EU (Lidington 2014). While the EU 
has pledged to ‘respect due process and the right to an effective remedy in full 
conformity with the jurisprudence of the EU Courts’ (Ashton 2012), the Council’s 
restoration of certain designations annulled by the Court illustrates the level of 
controversy associated with these rulings (The Economist 2015; Lidington 2014). 
Even though this is a distinctively European as opposed to global problem, it has 
induced a crisis of confidence whose magnitude has been equated to that caused 
by the 1990 Iraqi embargo (UNGA 2015, 68).
Discriminating between targets and non-targets
The design of measures aims to respect the distinction between those responsi-
ble for the violations condemned, and the population at large. Sanctions regimes 
such as that imposed on Zimbabwe in February 2002 purportedly blacklisted per-
sons whose activities ‘seriously undermine democracy, respect for human rights 
and the rule of law in Zimbabwe’ (Giumelli and Krulis 2012, 171). In justifying 
the sanctions imposed in response to the flawed elections in Belarus in 2006, 
then-Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy 
Benita Ferrero announced that the EU had blacklisted individuals bearing direct 
responsibility, stating that it was ‘important that sanctions be clearly focused, tar-
geting precisely the individuals—including Mr. Lukashenko—responsible for the 
fraudulent elections’ (Ferrero-Waldner 2006). Yet an evolution is discernible in the 
criteria governing listings in recent years. The standard formulation of ‘persons 
whose activities seriously undermine democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law’ has now evolved to ‘those identified as responsible for the policies or actions 
that have prompted the EU decisions to impose restrictive measures and those 
benefiting from and supporting such policies and actions’ (Council of the Euro-
pean Union 2012, 8).
The above phrase has made its way into legal documents: Current sanctions 
against Syria define its target group as ‘persons responsible for the violent 
repression against the civilian population in Syria, persons benefiting from 
or supporting the regime, and persons associated with them’ (Council of the 
European Union 2013, 18). The inclusion of ‘persons associated with’ those 
‘responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria’ 
and those ‘benefiting from or supporting the regime’ broadens the targeted 
circle considerably and introduces some definitional indeterminacy. While the 
population identified as responsible for condemned policies can be defined 
narrowly as it entails individuals in leadership positions, the formulation 
describing ‘those benefiting from and supporting such policies and actions’ 
appears potentially open-ended. Because it encompasses not only cronies—‘those 
benefiting’—but also supporters, this group could, in theory, extend to the entire 
population of the target country as long as it lends its backing to the leadership’s 
actions. For the purpose of targeting, it is unclear in what ways individuals or 
groups can be held to “benefit from” and “support” the regime, and how these 
can be told apart from those which do not.
Interestingly, refinements introduced in targeting criteria are not motivated by 
an ambition to determine more precisely the degree to which potential designa-
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tions are associated with condemned policies. Instead, innovation has been driven 
by the legal challenges that led the European Court to annul designations. Aware 
that its listings are subject to the scrutiny of the Court, the Council has adopted 
a more cautious approach to selecting targets. As a result, today’s listing criteria 
are less vulnerable to legal challenges than in the past, but not necessary fairer or 
targeted with more precision. The fact that Brussels took a longer time than Wash-
ington to blacklist individuals from the entourage of President Vladimir Putin 
(Fischer 2015) illustrates that EU faces legal constraints to which the US is not 
subject.
Preventing deprivation
The EU employs several methods to prevent deprivation. Because blacklists 
are invariably endowed with exemptions, designated persons are not subject to 
hardship. Sanctions legislation authorizes member states to release funds neces-
sary to satisfy the basic needs of persons whose assets have been frozen, includ-
ing payments for foodstuffs, rent, medical treatment, taxes and public utilities, 
or intended for the payment of legal services. Exceptions to the visa ban can be 
granted too. Given that blacklists often include entities, the release of funds can 
be authorized if necessary for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering medical 
supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance (Council of the Euro-
pean Union 2013, 20). Dedicated clauses foresee that member states may grant 
exceptions from the visa ban ‘where travel is justified on the grounds of urgent 
humanitarian need’, allowing blacklisted individuals to travel to the EU to receive 
medical treatment. The procedure for granting exceptions is on a non-objection 
basis: A member state wishing to grant an exception notifies the Council. The 
exemption is deemed to be approved unless another member raises an objection 
within two working days, in which case the Council decides by qualified majority 
(Council of the European Union 2013, 19). Exceptions for medical reasons are rou-
tinely granted (interviews with officials, 2007 and 2015).
A second method consists in the continuation of actions in support of the 
population concurrently to the sanctions, a peculiarity of EU policy which sets 
it apart from other senders. With regard to Belarus, former Commissioner Fer-
rero claimed: ‘We must avoid sanctions which harm the wider population’, and 
announced the provision of ‘support which directly benefits the population such 
as health [and] the environment’ (Ferrero-Waldner 2006). The EU’s preoccupation 
with sparing the population from deprivation becomes particularly evident with 
sanctions enacted on developing countries or crisis areas. This has given rise to 
the apparently paradoxical situation that aid to countries under sanctions is often 
increased. While the Harare leadership was under sanctions, the EU stepped up 
its aid to Zimbabwe on account of the severe food crisis of the mid-2000s. Since 
the restrictions imposed by Brussels did not affect trade, the EU remained Zim-
babwe’s second largest trading partner (Giumelli and Krulis 2012). Following 
Hamas’s victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections, the EU suspended payments 
to the Palestinian Authority, but aid to the Palestinian population was actually 
stepped up. Humanitarian aid is deliberately kept under a separate budget and is 
not affected by CFSP restrictions.
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Finally, the EU’s habit of deploying sanctions gradually limits the infliction of 
hardship. Its incremental strategy was explicitly spelt out with the current sanc-
tions against Russia in the context of the Ukraine crisis, where there has been 
talk of different phases (Christie 2016; Fischer 2015). The standard sequence starts 
with the limitation of contacts, consisting in a reduction of the number of bilateral 
meetings and/or the level at which they are held, sometimes accompanied by the 
suspension of bilateral agreements. The second stage entails the adoption of some 
CFSP measures, consisting of a visa ban and an arms embargo, which are later 
followed by the inclusion of new entries to the blacklists, and the enactment of an 
asset freeze (Giumelli and Krulis 2012; Portela 2010). Rarely has the EU moved to 
the final stage in the series, wielding measures that go beyond this triad, such as 
the Kosovo crisis in 1998 (de Vries 2002).
However, in some recent cases the EU has adopted more severe sanctions 
such as energy embargoes on oil or gas and commodity embargoes, in addition 
to a range of more sophisticated financial sanctions, signifying a qualitative leap 
in EU practice (Portela 2016). Measures imposed on Syria in 2011 including an 
embargo on oil and gas (Thomas 2013) and on Russia in 2014 covering extrac-
tion technology (Christie 2016) are cases in point. Other examples include EU 
measures supplementing UN sanctions on Iran in the period from 2010 until 2015 
and on Côte d’Ivoire in 2011, constituting some of the rare cases in which the EU 
has imposed autonomous sanctions supplementing a pre-existing UN sanctions 
regime (Brzoska 2015).
By imposing commodity embargoes and financial restrictions, the EU is moving 
up the discrimination scale, thus getting closer to causing hardship to “innocent 
bystanders”. Commodity embargoes have been identified as potential sources of 
unintended consequences: ‘Because natural resources trade can serve as the main 
source of revenue for the affected countries, there is an obvious possibility that 
legitimate trade could also be affected’ (UNGA 2015, 70). Similarly, a vigorous use 
of financial sanctions ‘might endanger the economy of a whole country or region, 
and thus go beyond the idea with targeted sanctions’ (Wallensteen et al 2006, 31). 
Financial and sectoral embargoes have been associated with the most significant 
effects on civilian health (McCarthy 2000).
During the post-electoral crisis that engulfed Côte d’Ivoire after President 
Laurent Gbabgo’s rejected the outcome of the 2010 election, the EU blacklisted a 
number of state enterprises including the company trading in cocoa as well as the 
country’s only international harbours, Abidjan and San Pedro. Given that cocoa is 
a key industry for the Ivorian economy, it has been claimed that ‘if the crisis had 
continued beyond April 2012, the humanitarian impact of [the] cocoa embargo 
would have been serious’ (Vines 2012, 875). In addition, the blacklisted ports were 
points of entry for supplies for the entire region. While the Ivorian crisis proved 
too short-lived for humanitarian effects to materialize, the EU demonstrated an 
unprecedented readiness to deviate from its characteristic restraint to facilitate 
Gbagbo’s downfall.
Autonomous restrictions on Syria and unilateral sanctions supplementing the 
UN package on Iran have been denounced as a departure from carefully targeted 
sanctions, marking a shift towards more comprehensive measures (Moret 2015). In 
Iran, while sanctions are recognized to have affected the economy, health care and 
the environment, a key humanitarian worry concerned the obstacles faced by local 
actors in the acquisition and distribution of medical and pharmaceutical supplies. 
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Although legislation exempted the importation of humanitarian items such as 
food and medicine, foreign companies and banks often forwent business owing 
to fear of repercussions, while insurance companies experienced difficulties when 
attempting to provide coverage to Iranian importers and exporters (UNGA 2014). 
Similar hindrances are currently documented in Syria, evidencing the pervasive 
limitations of exemption clauses to avoid humanitarian impacts (Walker 2016).
The ACP–EU framework
Since the mid-1990s, successive agreements between the EU and the ACP states—
Lomé IVa and Cotonou—enshrine democratic rule, respect for human rights and 
the rule of law as so-called “essential elements”. In the event of violation of these 
elements, any of the parties may call for consultations with the party at fault 
to agree on a roadmap for corrective action. Art. 96 of the Cotonou Convention 
authorizes the suspension of its application if consultations prove unfruitful, or if 
the commitments undertaken are not subsequently honoured. Officially, suspen-
sions are euphemistically referred to as “appropriate measures”, a term setting 
them apart not only from the word “sanction” but even from the EU jargon of 
“restrictive measures”. The suspension of the agreement entails the discontinu-
ation of development aid and trade preferences. In contrast to the CFSP, the EU 
has never produced a programmatic document on the policy it follows when sus-
pending the application of the ACP–EU Partnership agreement under Art. 96. The 
contours of EU suspension policy must thus be inferred from its evolving practice, 
vastly documented in legal instruments.
The suspension of agreements in implementation of the conditionality 
mechanism embedded in the EU–ACP treaty is reportedly reserved as ‘very much 
the last resort’ (Holland 2002, 133). Questioned about the possibility of suspending 
aid to Kenya following a clamp-down on pro-democracy demonstrations, then-
Commissioner for Development João Pinheiro confirmed that the suspension of 
aid was ‘considered to be a measure of last resort’ (Pinheiro 1998). Nevertheless, 
these measures are relatively frequent compared to CFSP practice. The suspension 
of agreements experienced a dramatic surge in the immediate aftermath of the 
Cold War as the EU enthusiastically embraced the promotion of democracy 
and human rights, but its frequency soon subsided (Borzyskowski and Portela 
2016). Still, with 33 instances of suspensions from 1990 to 2009 (Zimelis 2011), 
of which 15 occurred from 2000 to 2009 (Del Biondo 2009), Art. 96 is applied 
often in comparison with the rare invocation of suspension clauses in other EU 
agreements with third countries. For non-ACP countries, CFSP measures and a 
review of support strategies are preferred over the suspension of aid cooperation 
(European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy 2016).
Discrimination between targets and non-targets
Development aid suspensions follow an incremental logic similar to that described 
in the CFSP. Once the suspension has been agreed, the step-by-step resumption of 
cooperation is foreseen on a conditional basis. This is referred to as the ‘gradual 
and conditional approach’ (Portela 2010, 131). The design of the measures applied 
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under Art. 96 does not entail the withdrawal of aid, but rather its re-direction 
towards actors or aims other than those they had been originally allocated to. 
Suspensions only affect budget support administered directly by recipient state 
authorities. Only certain categories of aid are discontinued, leaving in place those 
types which benefit recipients unconnected to government authorities. While no 
new commitments are made, funds are re-directed to development projects imple-
mented by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Often, aid is used to support 
the implementation of the recipients’ commitment to restore the constitutional 
order, such as preparing elections (Portela 2010, 132).
The rationale behind the present approach is clearly to deprive the leadership 
of the benefits associated with presenting themselves as providers of public ser-
vices and infrastructure projects vis-a-vis their citizenry. Rather than signifying 
the end of the aid relationship, partial forms of suspensions entail ‘a warning to 
the incumbent government to address the issues at stake, an invitation to negoti-
ate measures so as to correct what has been going wrong’ (Molenaers et al 2015, 
63). From that point of view, the measures follow a discriminatory logic which 
disadvantages the leadership at fault. While an attempt at targeting is made, 
Art. 96 suspensions are less targeted than CFSP sanctions are. Budget support 
suspensions can only be wielded against state authorities, and they penalize the 
state apparatus as a whole, rather than only the top leadership. Measures are not 
‘personalized’ as no specific individuals are designated. In contrast to CFSP sanc-
tions, leaders responsible for the acts condemned by the EU—coups d’état, vio-
lent repression or other human rights violations—continue to be allowed to hold 
assets abroad and travel freely to Europe.
Preventing deprivation
Despite the suspensions, a long list of actions are not discontinued in order to 
ensure that the population is spared from deprivation. Suspensions decided 
under Art. 96 are normally partial in nature, even though full suspension remain 
an option. Programmes to support the most vulnerable sections of the population 
are left in place. The suspension is only enforced for prospective projects, leav-
ing on-going programmes unaffected. Humanitarian aid is expressly exempted 
(see above). Cross-border regional projects involving several countries are kept 
in place. Aid in direct support of the population—including health, education, 
rural development or food security programmes—is channelled through NGOs 
and remains unaffected. Finally, EU member states’ aid programmes remain fully 
independent from EU aid.
The EU’s commitment to avoid humanitarian hardship in the impoverished 
ACP group is evident beyond the framing of its development aid suspensions. 
A most illustrative example demonstrating the EU’s preoccupation with the pro-
tection of civilian populations is that of Burundi, which was subject to a full eco-
nomic blockade by neighbouring countries in 1996. The embargo was eventually 
terminated at the instigation of the EU, which, concerned about humanitarian 
consequences, threatened Burundi’s neighbours with suspension from the ACP 
Partnership Agreement if they persisted (Wohlgemuth 2005).
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The GSP framework
For decades, developing countries have been receiving preferential market access 
to the European market under the EU’s GSP, enshrined in a Council regulation 
revised periodically. Eligibility for the GSP scheme is determined by criteria of 
economic vulnerability. The system features two subcategories in addition to the 
general scheme: Least developed countries (LDCs) benefit from a particularly 
favourable treatment on the basis of their underdevelopment. A third category 
consists in a special incentive system labelled “GSP+” which grants enhanced tar-
iff preferences in return for beneficiaries’ compliance with fundamental Interna-
tional Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions and international agreements on 
sustainable development and good governance. To benefit from GSP+, countries 
must ratify and implement eight fundamental ILO conventions and seven con-
ventions on human rights and environmental governance. For all schemes, nega-
tive political conditionality foresees the temporary withdrawal of preferences in 
response to serious and systematic breaches of core human and labour rights by 
the beneficiary country: ‘The reasons for temporary withdrawal of the arrange-
ments under the scheme should include serious and systematic violations of the 
principles laid down in certain international conventions concerning core human 
rights and labour rights’ (European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union 2012, 3).
In case of breach of GSP+ commitments, beneficiaries are downgraded to the 
general scheme. According to the suspension procedure, any EU member state or 
third party concerned may bring violations to the attention of the Commission. 
Upon investigating the matter, the Commission may then propose suspension 
to the Council, which decides by qualified majority taking into account reports 
by external supervisory bodies such as the ILO. The record of GSP withdrawal is 
meagre: Preferences were withdrawn from Myanmar in 1997 (but reinstated in 
2013), and from Belarus in 2006. Venezuela saw preferences downgraded from 
GSP+ to the general scheme, due to Caracas’ failure to ratify the UN Convention 
against corruption, while Sri Lanka was suspended in 2009 because of human rights 
violations in the course of the military campaign against the rebel group Tamil Tigers.
Discrimination between targets and non-targets
The withdrawal of GSP privileges entails the restoration of normal trade flows—
that is, regular duties apply again for products of the suspended beneficiary 
entering the common market. The nature of the products which had benefited 
from preferences is determined by the EU on the basis of commercial and 
development considerations. Thus, there are no discriminating mechanisms in 
place to maintain preferences for sectors which are not associated with responsible 
actors while restating duties on products associated with sectors affined to them, 
possibly because such policy might contravene international trade law.
Although suspension cases are rare and evidence on their impacts is scarce, 
the criticisms directed at the GSP suspension on Myanmar largely pertain to its 
non-targeted nature. The garment sector, whose exports had flourished thanks to 
a lack of tariffs, was fatally hit by the suspension of trade preferences by the US 
and the EU, which had previously absorbed 90 per cent of production. At the time 
the suspension was agreed, it was believed that costs to the Myanmar economy 
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would be low overall (Lerch 2004, 259). Yet, instead of harming state-owned 
enterprises, the burden fell on small private businesses while joint ventures of 
foreign companies and state-linked enterprises survived (Jones 2015, 107). Because 
it hit the wrong targets, it has been argued that the GSP suspension hampered the 
emergence of social forces which might have become opposition constituencies 
(Jones 2015, 125).
Preventing deprivation
The GSP suspension does not entail any provisions geared towards preventing 
deprivation in the affected beneficiary. Nevertheless, the differentiation of three 
categories of preferences respects a hierarchy based on the level of development 
of the beneficiary: the GSP+ scheme features stronger conditionality rules than the 
other categories. Yet GSP+ beneficiaries which do not honour additional voluntary 
commitments are still granted regular GSP privileges. The conditionality applicable to 
the general scheme and to Everything-but-Arms (EBA) are weaker as they only apply 
to serious and persistent breaches of core labour and human rights. The fact that EBA, 
the most favourable scheme, is applicable to the most underdeveloped beneficiaries 
represents the only protection against deprivation embedded in the EU’s GSP.
Conclusions
Although the EU has traditionally followed a narrow interpretation of targeted 
sanctions guided by the intention to discriminate between responsible leaders and 
civilian population, our review reveals an imperfect picture.
Firstly, recent CFSP sanctions cases signify a departure from the narrowly 
defined targeted-ness typical of EU practice. Target groups are not circumscribed 
to leaderships; instead, they extend to a potentially vast population of supporters. 
This re-definition of criteria for target selection was induced by the threat posed to 
EU sanctions by court rulings, rather than by considerations of fairness in target-
ing. As a result, sanctions are becoming less rather than more targeted.
Secondly, a trend is visible towards the increasing adoption of sanctions of an 
economic nature such as commodity embargoes and financial sanctions, likely to 
cause a decline in the living standards of the population, to the detriment of more 
narrowly targeted strategies. Severe sanctions on Syria or Iran illustrate this sce-
nario. What is worrying about this evolution is that it has not been accompanied 
by enhancements in the planning of measures and monitoring of impacts. As Erica 
Moret has argued, if the EU is moving to tougher measures, it should acknowl-
edge ‘the humanitarian ramifications and the moral and practical responsibilities’ 
arising from this choice (2014, 14). While no evidence indicates that EU sanctions 
have caused humanitarian hardship on any of its targets, such a scenario cannot 
be fully discarded, and it is indeed becoming increasingly likely.
Thirdly, sanctions imposed by the EU outside the framework of the CFSP do 
not fit targeted-ness criteria adequately. Different targeting logics co-exist in the 
EU sanctions landscape without any other apparent justification than the com-
partmentalization governing the organization’s external policies (Portela and 
Orbie 2014). On account of the economic underdevelopment of the ACP group, 
the preoccupation with avoiding harm is as important with Art. 96 suspensions as 
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with CFSP measures. This is in keeping with international practice, which spares 
the most severely impoverished countries from high levels of economic pressure 
‘precisely because the sender state is unwilling to fully apply the measures against 
them’ (Taylor 2009, 120). However, there is no apparent rationale for the lack of 
individualization of targetable actors in the ACP and GSP frameworks. On the 
contrary, the underdeveloped nature of the targets constitutes an incentive for 
focusing pressure on them as opposed to altering aid flows. Disappointingly, in 
contrast to CFSP and Art. 96 sanctions, GSP suspensions emerge as a tool not 
amenable to targeting.
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